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The hypothesis we present in this paper is about the representation of colours in the nervous system as metaphysical 
and immaterial properties of the neural activations, fi rst in the lateral geniculate body and following in the primary 
visual cortex, where the colours are not directly coded but whose representation is modulated by a signal born by fewer 
neurons. The metaphysical background of this hypothesis is the dualism of properties that will be discussed in the last 
paragraph of this article.
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INTRODUCTION
In this article we will introduce a peculiar 
idea about the relationship between the colours 
of the visual perceptual fi eld and the electrical 
activations of the primal cortex V1’s neurons, 
hitherto believed to be underlying it. First, we 
will make a brief recapitulation of how the signal 
from the retinas reaches the primary cortex, 
then we will proceed to express our hypothesis 
up to its philosophical justifi cation. This latter 
part will take no more than a few pages, such 
as needed to express an idea in a coherent and 
concise manner. 
METHODS
In this paper we will display a method to 
translate the cerebral activity of V1 cortex into a 
mind representation, applied to colours. 
If we take into consideration a three-axis 
system as the Cartesian axes, to every point in the 
system we can associate a value that corresponds 
to a continuous or discrete value between 0 and 
1. That represents a single neural activation in V1 
cortex and corresponds to the modulate signal 
that comes from the retina. We can translate it in 
another three axis system to show the visus so that 
at every level of neural activation of the fi rst type 
corresponds a determined point (a,b,c) which is 
associated to an instantiated property (i.e. “r”); 
that is the particular colour that appears in the 
visus at the level of elaboration of a singular cell 
of the lateral geniculate body (Hubel, 1988). 
Regardless of the functioning of the neural 
sub-stratus, this translation permits us to move 
from the all-or-nothing single cell events of V1 
to the immaterial events of the fi rst perceptive 
part of the mind-brain. We could even add 
another dimension with the inclination of the 
contour that is prerogative of V1, but it is not the 
point here. The main signifi cance is that by using 
this method we are able to translate the nervous 
signal into its immaterial properties. Our purpose 
with this paper is to provide examples as well as 
a fruitful visual representation to showcase the 
procedure we conceived.
WHAT IS A SPOT OF COLOUR IN THE 
LATERAL GENICULATE BODY
As we have just ascertained, the information 
that goes from P cells to V1 is retained. What 
happens to the activation of V1 cells? For 
simplicity, let’s assume that the V1 cells 
exemplify our visual fi eld (see for example 
Lamme at al., 2000; for the theme of V1 
contribution in visual awareness) and that the 
colours are intangible properties of the electrical 
activation of the cells in V1 (How and why this 
is possible and convenient will be explained 
in the last paragraph). It is therefore possible 
to associate with each retinotopic activation of 
the cells in the lateral geniculate body of the 
thalamus, and consequently in V1, a spot colour 
appearance in our visual fi eld. The same goes for 
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V1: at every activation of singular cells we can 
link a complex representation of characters of 
the visus in V1. 
If we grant, hypothetically, that the information 
about colours is represented in geniculate 
lateral body’s step of elaboration (see, for an 
overview on perception of colours, Gouras, 
1991 and Kaiser & Boynton, 1996), each cell 
can be identifi ed in our three axis system form 
a point with coordinates A,B,C and an activation 
between 0 and 1 whether it is continuous or 
discrete. This way, for any given electrical 
activation of a A-value between 0 and 1, a given 
spot of colour corresponds to our spectrum in 
visual coordinates of the “red”, “yellow” or 
“green” type, for example, and will have the 
respective coordinates to the retinotopic ones 
of the type A,B,C, in our fi eld of vision at the 
geniculate lateral body’s level.
This is a way to link the immateriality of 
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colours, that seem to have no causal powers and 
therefore have to be expelled from the realm 
of physical and material things, to the physical 
aspects of the neural activations of the visual 
cortex and electrical activations, which is their 
most important feature. All of this starting 
from a homogeneous basic activation and a 
total correspondence between retinotopy and 
“coloured” visual fi eld.
This can be exemplifi ed by means of two 
images.
The fi rst image roughly represents the 
activation of a singular cell, while the second 
shows the result of the activation in the visual 
fi eld at the lateral geniculate body’s level of 
representation. Naturally, there are steps of 
elaboration and synchronic activation that we 
cannot consider to have the location of the fi nal 
spot in a three-dimensional manner, since once 
the stream of information has reached the V1 
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cortex, a singular activation can represents a 
large part of the visual fi eld and not necessarily a 
single spot of colour.
According to our hypothesis, the fact that 
cells are never completely silent is refl ected in 
the fact that the visual fi eld is a metaphysically 
unitary fi eld, in which the colour spots change 
as the excitation of the cells of the retina and the 
quality of the incoming light vary. 
In the next paragraph, we will talk about the 
philosophical background of the ideas displayed 
until now.
A KIND OF PROPERTY DUALISM
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2020) thus defi nes the property dualism:
“Whereas predicate dualism says that there are two 
essentially diff erent kinds of predicates in our language, 
property dualism says that there are two essentially 
diff erent kinds of property out in the world. Property 
dualism can be seen as a step stronger than predicate 
dualism. Although the predicate ‘hurricane’ is not 
equivalent to any single description using the language 
of physics, we believe that each individual hurricane is 
nothing but a collection of physical atoms behaving in 
a certain way: one need have no more than the physical 
atoms, with their normal physical properties, following 
normal physical laws, for there to be a hurricane. One 
might say that we need more than the language of 
physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do 
not need more than its ontology. There is token identity 
between each individual hurricane and a mass of atoms, 
even if there is no type identity between hurricanes as 
kinds and some particular structure of atoms as a kind. 
Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the 
individual level, the ontology of physics is not suffi  cient 
to constitute what is there. The irreducible language 
is not just another way of describing what there is, it 
requires that there be something more there than was 
allowed for in the initial ontology. Until the early part 
of the twentieth century, it was common to think that 
biological phenomena (‘life’) required property dualism 
(an irreducible ‘vital force’), but nowadays the special 
physical sciences other than psychology are generally 
thought to involve only predicate dualism. In the case 
of mind, property dualism is defended by those who 
argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not 
merely another way of categorizing states of the brain or 
of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon”
The dualism of properties is the philosophical 
position that best describes the relationship 
shown between the electrical phenomenon of 
neural origin and its phenomenal counterpart, 
the spot of colour which is, in our case, simply 
immaterial (see also Lavazza & Robinson, 2014). 
The fact that a physical phenomenon, such as 
the electrical impulse of a neural nature, have 
a property like a colour that does not interact 
with the objects of the world outside ourselves, 
is, in our opinion, a fundamental property of 
our perception. It  means there is the possibility 
to belong to an immaterial realm, in which on 
one hand the laws of physics remain unchanged 
and causally closed (for a historical version of 
the problem see Davidson, 1980), while our 
perceptions, taken for themselves, can guide our 
being in the world.
The immaterial structure of the perceived, 
composed into a unitary perception, can in 
fact guide us through retinal stimulation, 
neural electrical activations and their causal 
relationships without being there a real change 
in the natural order of things. The ability of 
metaphysical properties to guide physical 
activations will only be limited by the laws that 
regulate the realm of physical things.
This dualism of properties isn’t just more 
suitable in this case, but also desirable (see, 
for example, Yang, 2015): if the immaterial 
intangible properties were independent, so to 
speak, they would have no causal powers and 
would be irrelevant. If, on the other hand, they 
were physical, we would have to increase the 
ontology of brain phenomena indefi nitely and 
in a highly unrealistic way to the state of our 
knowledge. In this connotation, we should see 
colours, shapes etc. jump out of the skull.
In a broader sense, if the possibility of 
change of the “objective experience” is due to 
the immaterial part of corresponding neural 
activation, then the phenomenon of intentionality 
towards - and the subjective experience of 
- “something diff erent” are not a problem 
anymore. The mental, immaterial part of neural 
activity that is considered the fi xed condition 
of the “constant change” of our experience 
is exactly the environment in which we see, 
smell, etc., and in which we act intentionally 
as immaterial agent with cognitive and causal 
powers (for further discussion of this issue, see 
i.e. Searle, 1983).
That the objects outside our immaterial 
experience can interact with the physical body 
is not surprising anymore. It is clear that when 
we encounter an object in our experience, we 
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encounter its counterpart in the extra-mental 
experience, mainly in the tactile experience. 
However, the limitation of this position is the 
limitation of the position itself. There are many 
philosophical theories about the mind nowadays, 
and they swing between the hard reductionism 
and the pure dualism. This version is a form of 
dualism, as we have seen, but the proof of the 
theory over every kind of argumentation, if any, 
should be an empirical one.
What is surprising is that the immaterial 
reality can drive ourselves, our physical body, 
in the world outside our experience. The 
answer is probably in the computational power 
and plasticity of our brain, and in the role the 
immaterial part of our neural activity plays into 
guide our brain in its development.
CONCLUSIONS
In the second paragraph, after the method 
section, we portrayed how the neural activity 
that starts from the retina reaches the nerve 
fi bers of the primary visual cortex. The 
characteristics of the signal and all the necessary 
steps of retransmission of the neural signal 
were summarily displayed to show how a spot 
of colour could appear in a given portion of the 
visual fi eld due to the activation of the geniculate 
lateral corps, at the stage of elaboration of V1 
cortex, even if not yet in the three-dimensional 
visual fi eld.
In the third paragraph, the fundamental idea 
for this article was introduced. The colour spot 
that corresponds to neural electrical activation 
was considered to be the immaterial property of 
the same electrical phenomenon of neural origin, 
and a real correlation was established between 
the electrical impulse of a neuron and the 
appearance in the visual fi eld of a coloured spot. 
The representation of these events postulated 
that the representation of the entire visual fi eld 
was already in V1 by means of the synchronic 
activation of the geniculate lateral body’s cells. 
This is not literally true, but served as a mean to 
enhance the explanation of our hypothesis: that 
the colour spot that corresponds to the perceived 
signal is an intangible property of the electrical 
phenomenon of neural origin.
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how a philosophical position such as the 
dualism of properties is the best one to account 
for the immaterial phenomenon taken into 
consideration. It allows us to explain both why 
the colours do not leap out of the head as objects 
as well as why the laws of physics and the causal 
closure of the universe are not questioned by 
the organized and driving appearance of these 
phenomena. Moreover, it was seen how, on this 
account, intentionality and subjectivity can be 
explained.
